Introduction
According to the Italian Constitution, article 32, "the Republic protects health as a fundamental individual right and in the public interest. It guarantees free of charge health care services to the poor". It is in the light of this Constitutional provision, with a strong flavour in terms of equity, that one needs to begin the journey through the evolution of the Italian health care system, from its creation at the end of the Seventies up to now. To present the road ahead, I will first concentrate on presenting the evolution of the system in Section 1. I will then discuss the results of about thirty years of the Italian Servizio Sanitario Nazionale -both in terms of efficiency and equity -in Section 2. I leave to Section 3 some thoughts on the future problems to be solved, including the current policy discussion and the long-run impact of population ageing.
A brief (institutional) history of the Italian Servizio Sanitario Nazionale

From the creation of the SSN to European constraints on public finances
Three are the fundamental reforms that structured the Italian Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN from now on): the Law 833/1978; the Legislative Decrees 502/1992 and 517/1993; the Legislative Decree 229/1999. The first of these laws basically created the SSN, by substituting over 100 health insurance funds -largely a reflection of the corporative nature of the Italian Welfare State -with a unique universal and comprehensive public fund. The second and the third reforms were instead implemented during the Nineties, an era of extensive reforms and counterreforms pushed forward in an effort of reaching a new equilibrium for the Italian public finances, plagued by a huge stock of debt.
SSN. These are complex organisations combining administrative and care services, including producers like public hospitals, and involving one or more municipalities, that can freely contract also with private producers for the provision of care.
The idea of involving municipalities in the management of health care was basically to guarantee participation of citizens to the process of planning. While probably correct in principle, this involvement resulted in a strong political control at a local level of a politically hot issue like health care. This -in turn -contributed to create large inefficiencies and a large growth in expenditure, with massive deficits generated every year (see Figure 1a and 1b below).
Planning at the central level was to be based on the National Health Plan, ideally a three-years program defining: the amount of financing of the National Health Fund, the criteria for apportioning the Fund to Regions, the goals to be pursued by the SSN. Starting from the National Plan, Regional Governments had to define their own Regional Health Plans, sharing common goals but with freedom of choice as for the organization of services (e.g., the hospital network, the role of private providers, …).
The total amount of funding was (and still is) defined by the Central Government in accordance -at least in principle -with Regional Governments, distinguishing between funds for current expenditures and for investments. Allocation of funds to each Region was a task assigned to the Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE, literally a Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning) on the basis of indices and standards to be chosen in order to guarantee territorial equity in the provision of services (art. 51, law 833/78). In turn, Regional Governments need to allocate funds to their Local Health Units in accordance with municipalities. Again, the parameters for the apportionment formula have to be chosen so as to assure uniform services in each Local Health Unit.
The National Health Fund was financed (up to 1992) by two basic sources: sickness contributions (to be levied on the gross wages or pensions, adding to social security contributions) and Central Government funds. Sickness contributions were guaranteed by making mandatory the enrolment to the public health insurance for all citizens starting from January 1 st , 1980. Certainly, for a universal public health insurance scheme with a strong equity flavour, like the newly created SSN, these different sources of funds generated some confusion, resulting in a mix between a 'corporative' and a 'social-democratic' welfare model. This was not, however, the main problem plaguing the SSN. Most important issues were the inabilities to plan and define goals by the Central Government, as well as the allocation of responsibilities across different layers of governments, resulting in a misalignment between expenditure and funding. As for the planning at the national level, even though the art. 54 of law 833/78 established that the first plan for the 1980-1982 period was to be presented in Parliament within April 30 th , 1979, the first National Health Plan has been really presented in 1994, after sixteen years and a new reform of the SSN. As for the spread of responsibilities across different layers of governments, this surely contributed (and still continues to contribute, at least to some extent) to create inefficiencies, corruption and waste of resources, because of: the opportunistic behaviour of local governments in the presence of the Central Government footing their bill; and a strict political control of USL, which guaranteed local politicians a large power and -consequently -a number of votes, but left citizens with worse-than-expected services given expenditure, especially in some areas of the country. The reforms put forward during the Nineties tried to tackle exactly these shortcomings of the original design of the SSN. I examine each in turn.
The 1992-1993 wave of reforms
Public health care expenditure was out of control during the Eighties, with doubledigit annual growth rates, and ex-ante funding always inferior to ex-post expenditure (Figure 1a and 1b) . Despite taking contrary stands, during the whole period the Central Government stepped in and bailed out regional deficits on a almost regular basis of two-three years, probably recognising some degree of underfunding (which was motivated by the short lives of governments). But the political landscape was on the eve of a critical change for the Italian public finance. In 1992, after a severe political and financial crisis, that basically destroyed the old system of political parties and brought the country close to default, the Central Government defined one of the most impressive fiscal crunch of the Italian history, making the first painful steps on the way to meet the Maastricht Treaty constraints. The ratification of the Treaty is a landmark in the management of post-war public finance in Italy: it made clear that the huge deficits of the past were unsustainable, and opened the door to a number of reforms aiming at controlling expenditure in a 'structural' way. These winds of change touched, among other issues, electoral rules (to strengthen governments in power at all levels), pensions, and -of course -health care.
The 1992-1993 reforms due to a Centre-Left governing coalition guided by Giuliano Amato tried to address all the problems afflicting the SSN. As for the inefficiencies in the provision of services, and the political control of USL, the reforms were inspired by the introduction of quasi-markets in the British NHS in 1990. Basically, the idea behind quasi-markets was to split providers from purchaser of services, in order to obtain -via competition for patients -a boost in efficiency, without any changes in the equity to be guaranteed in a universal public health insurance scheme. This was exactly the objective pursued by Central Government. However, well-known potential drawbacks in the quasi-markets organisation are the increase in the volume of services, the lack of competition in some areas of the country, and the cream-skimming of patients by certain types of providers. Of course, given these drawbacks, at this stage there was no empirical evidence on the effectiveness of this mechanism in curbing expenditure, which was a second main goal to be pursued with the reforms. 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Officer, to be appointed by Regional Governments; a Board of Statutory Auditors for internal audits, with up to five members appointed by Regional Governments (2 members), the Municipal Governments (1), and the Ministry of the Economy (2). As we will see below, however, the political control -once finding close the door of Municipal governments -came back through the window of Regional governments.
Moreover, despite the design of an efficient internal organisation, ASL were (and still are in some cases) far away from managing funds efficiently: managers appointed by politicians sometimes rely more on political pressures than on market forces in allocating funds; the internal auditors sometimes do not audit much.
A second change required by the move toward the quasi-market model was to separate producers from purchasers of services. The basic implication here was for ASL to hive off hospitals, and create the so-called Aziende Ospedaliere (AO, literally Hospital Firms). ASL were supposed to retain mostly administrative services (including the definition of needs at the local level), and then contract with different producers (from GPs to newborn AO) services for their policyholders (i.e., all residents in their jurisdiction). Again, this fundamental change had different implications: since the ASL had to contract with producers, they also needed to define a price for the services to be purchased. The solution proposed was to introduce a prospective payment system (PPS) based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) -created in the US at the beginning of the Eighties and experimented in the US Medicare -which basically substituted per-day fees for private providers and full ex-post payment for public hospitals 2 . In turn, this solution implied a change in hospital management, imposing an administrative burden on nurses and physicians:
the Scheda di Dimissione Ospedaliera (SDO, literally Discharge Form) had to be filled in order to require payment from the ASL of the hospital services provided. Of course, the SDO was useful to identify for each patient the DRG and the corresponding tariff; but the tariffs had still to be defined. After the initial proposal of a national listing of charges, Regional Governments were set free to adopt their own. In any case, the new PPS had to be started between 1995 and 1997; in the absence of regional tariffs, Regions should then adopt the national ones. Again, also these changes were more promised than realised: only one region (Lombardy) separated all providers from purchasers. Moreover, after the initial years following the reform, also the PPS-DRG system was partly abandoned in favour of a budgetbased approach, especially with private producers.
As for the SSN funding, the 1992-1993 reforms emphasised the change in the balance of power in favour of Regional Governments, by explicitly assigning sickness contributions to regional budgets. Together with the introduction of a property tax to finance municipalities in the same year, this was the first fundamental move towards the introduction of some degree of fiscal decentralization in the Italian context. The move has to be interpreted as a first trial to explicitly solve the misalignment between expenditure and funding responsibilities, in order to make more accountable local governments. It was inspired both by the pressures exercised by new political parties combating against corruption and inefficiencies, that rapidly 2 Of course, also the DRG-PPS system has its pros in the fact that -being a fixed price mechanismit should boost efficiency. But it also have its own cons, like up-coding, cream-skimming, skimping, dumping, … gained votes in Northern Regions (especially the Lega Nord, literally North Alliance), and by the precepts of second-generation fiscal federalism theories, rapidly evolving those same years (e.g., Oates, 2005; Weingast, 2009) . To emphasise that the devolution of own resources to Regional Governments was aimed at increasing their accountability, the Legislative Decree 502/92 explicitly excluded that the Central Government would take care of any future deficits (art. 13). Unfortunately, this is another unfulfilled promise.
Given the introduction of a seminal form of fiscal federalism, the apportionment of the National Health Fund slightly changed. The major change was not in the apportionment formula itself (still based on some parameters identifying needs), but in the logic behind the working of the Fund. After devolution of sickness contributions, the role of general taxation was to top-up regional resources in order to cover regional financial requirements. The huge territorial differences in the tax bases caused (and still cause) very different vertical imbalances for each region: in particular, Southern regions need to receive more funds from Central Government than Centre-Northern regions. The equalisation role played by the National Health
Fund was then magnified in this new context. This presumably propelled the tensions among regions, and further strengthened the idea to move toward a more mature form of fiscal federalism.
The 1999 reform
The call for fiscal federalism received another boost after the substitution of sickness Given that some services are explicitly excluded from those provided by the SSN, the Legislative Decree 229/99 introduced also Supplementary Funds of the SSN (art. 9). These are thought as public or private insurance schemes that cannot select risks and can offer coverage for (1) all the services excluded from SSN and (2) the copayments required for some of the services included in the LEA. At present, they play a very minor role in the Italian landscape: not surprisingly, private health care spending in Italy is almost entirely out-of-pocket.
As already discussed, the Legislative Decree 229/99 also reneged the quasi-market model just introduced, and called for more 'co-operation' between ASL and providers, particularly private providers. In essence, this meant that ASL should contract with private providers assigning them a given budget and a given role in the provision of services.
The 1999 reform also pushed for more integration between health care and social care policies, again stressing the role of SSN in combating inequities, deprivation and social exclusion (art. 3 -septies). Integration involved the responsibility of municipalities in providing social services to disadvantaged people, like the elderly.
Included are services like those provided by, e.g., nursing homes.
Finally, the 1999 reform made it definitely clear that the management of health care
services was a responsibility of Regional Governments. In the light of these changes, it was more a reform setting principles than a reform aimed at solving the structural problems of the SSN. Despite the effectiveness implicit in the definition of the LEA, these principles were those characterising the original design of the SSN: a clear emphasis on equity, and a much less focus on efficiency.
The dawn of the new century in the Italian SSN
The Italian SSN stemming from reforms implemented during the Nineties appears to be different from the original design of the Law 833/78, even though -at the beginning of the new century -it was (and still is) unclear the shape of the new project. The conflict between reforms and counter-reforms that characterised the first twenty years of the SSN are most likely deriving from an apparent tension between efficiency and equity, which characterised also the first ten years of the new century.
Despite the difficulties in identifying the whole picture, there are then few important pieces of the puzzle that can help in clearing potential developments. A first The philosophy inspiring the project was to increase regional accountability by both increasing Regions' fiscal autonomy and -contemporaneously -the freedom to manage their budget within the limits of the framework legislation defined at the Central level (removing earmarked transfers). In this perspective, the 'solidarity coefficient' in the equalisation formula was fixed at 90% to guarantee an 'incomplete' equalisation. In other words, part of the own revenues were excluded from equalisation to provide appropriate incentives to Regional governments to correctly manage their revenues. Not surprisingly, this mechanism would have favoured Regions with a larger fiscal capacity (i.e., mostly Northern Regions). costs', and -in particular -the Regional Health Services to be used as benchmarks.
However, how the 'standard costs' will influence the allocation of funds is still unclear. The apportionment of funds is still based on a measure of needs as in the past, while the total amount of resources is defined according to macroeconomic constraints on public budget. The agreement for 2010 confirms this view, postponing to the future the complete implementation of the new mechanism (e.g., Muraro, 2011).
An overall evaluation of the Italian SSN: where do we stand?
In this Section of the essay, I discuss the impact of these regulations on efficiency and equity in the provision of health care services in Italy 3 . I start by considering the country as a whole, comparing the performance of the Italian SSN with the performance of health care systems in other similar European countries. I then move to the analysis of regional differences.
Taken together, the Italian SSN performs fairly well with respect to other spending categories (for instance, education). Following a pattern similar to most Western countries, health care expenditure reached 7.1% of GDP in 2009, with an increase in the last year mainly due to the fall in the denominator than to an increase in spending ( Figure 2 ). However, compared to other countries, like France, Germany and Sweden, the level of spending is lower: Italians spend less during the whole first decade of the XXI century; only Spain spent a bit less during the same period. Also the recent dynamics is relatively slow: differently from the past, when -especially at the end of the Eighties -the rate of growth was worrisome, being well above 10% each year, the rate of growth is recently under control and further slowing down (see If we consider more complete evaluation exercises, these conclusions do not change very much. For instance, in one of the benchmarking exercises carried out across countries, the World Health Organization ranked health care systems according to three goals that they should pursue: the level and the distribution of health, the level and the distribution of responsiveness, the fairness in financial contribution (WHO, 2000) . Ranking 11 th in terms of per-capita total health spending, the Italian SSN ranked 2 nd taking into account all the three goals, just behind the French system, which is however the 4 th in terms of spending. Germany, ranking 3 rd for spending, performs poorly compared to Italy, since it is only 25 th in terms of overall evaluation.
But this fairly nice picture at the country level hides unacceptable differences at the regional level, and generalised problems in terms of governance and control of euro). Given large differences in terms of fiscal capacity, it is clear that the SSN operated ex-ante a strong redistribution in favour of less endowed regions (i.e., the Southern Regions). This is clear when looking at the share of own resources out of the total funding for health care, which is about half for Centre-North regions and less than 20% for Southern regions (Table 1) .
However, this ex-ante redistribution is spoiled by Regional governments when managing the funds they receive; and, unfortunately, this is especially true for Southern Regions. Considering "ex-post redistribution", i.e. redistribution evaluated by taking into account services effectively consumed by citizens, requires spending levels to be corrected for a number of factors, such as population age, patients mobility, and complexity of services, in order to be somewhat comparable across regions. Conducting a similar exercise, researchers at the Bank of Italy suggests that -being 100 the per-capita spending at the national level -Southern Regions spend 104, Centre Regions 101.9, while Northern Regions only 96 (Alampi et al., 2010) . In other words, Northern Regions contribute heavily to transfer resources to Southern
Regions, and spend better and more efficiently the resources they retain. Evidence on this point are widespread, and can be grasped by looking at official data on the perceived quality of services (Figure 3 ), patient mobility, inappropriateness. All indicators point in the same direction: Southern regions are the worst performers at the country level . Finanze (2010) One important question is why Southern Regions spend more. According to Alampi et al. (2010) , for a number of reasons: a) because pharmaceutical and hospital expenditures is higher than in other regions, and these categories are those more costly; b) because the hospital network is badly managed: there are too many hospitals, small-sized, where people obtain inappropriate services of low quality; c) because there are too many prescriptions by GPs of inappropriate drugs, and of more costly drugs by given active ingredient. Of course, this does not solve the problem, and one may still ask why pharmaceutical and hospital expenditures are higher or why there are too many prescriptions by GPs in Southern Regions. There are not, however, easy answers here. One possible explanation is related to the lack of planning. For instance, Pelliccia and Trimaglio (2009) Inefficiencies take many different forms: apart from those already mentioned above for the abnormal role assigned to hospitals, the report of the Parliamentary Commission "Carella" (from the name of its President) suggests other types. To list a few: hospitals in the South are characterised by structural deficiencies, like the absence of minimal security standard and "elementary" hygienic conditions; a greater inertia in the use of funds for healthcare facilities 4 ; a connected problem of still unfinished or finished-but-never-used health care facilities (e.g., Caroppo and Turati, 2007) .
Inefficiency however is not the sole explanation; because inefficiency sometimes is the result of corruption. Indeed, a second important explanation for the worst performance of Southern Regions is the presence in these areas of criminal organizations: public health care is -in some Regions -the first industry in terms of GDP, and this allures criminals and creates -in the absence of financial responsibility -a perverse mechanism. To clarify this point, the 'exchange' is structured as follows: criminal organizations gather vote for regional politicians, and politicians guarantee jobs and monies. Not surprisingly, then, in these realities the Regional Health Service is not thought primarily as providing services to citizens, but providing a job to some and monies to others in exchange for votes; with somebody else footing the bills (e.g., Lane, 2009 ). The presence of corruption is likely to fuel also regional deficits, that in the last few years have shown the tendency to strongly concentrate in a small subset of Southern Regions (particularly, Lazio, Campania, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia). Notice thatwhile the mechanism for obtaining additional funds is less "automatic" than in the past -the Central government is likely to step in and bailout past debts, should the Regional governments become unable to guarantee their financial stability (e.g., Bordignon and Turati, 2008) .
th quintile
Summing up, despite the nice picture of the Italian SSN at the aggregate level, the situation at the regional level shows large differences, all pointing in a clear direction: Southern Regions perform worse than Centre-North ones. According to the available evidence, the main problem is not the lack of funds, but how (mostly) transferred funds are managed at the local level. In other words redistribution exante (i.e., the equalisation of fiscal capacities) is not matched by ex-post redistribution (i.e., the equalisation of services for citizens). It is this mismatch that creates the tensions that will drive the likely changes in the near future.
Winds of change?
Given the good standing at the aggregate level, and the Regional differences outlined in the previous section, it is not surprising that there are tensions which are expected to characterise the future evolution of the Italian SSN. As already emphasised, in my view these tensions find their fundamental origin in the lack of correlation between ex-ante and ex-post redistribution. Centre-North Regions focus on the massive ex-ante redistribution which occurred in the past and it is still occurring today in the country, but which generated inefficiencies and corruption instead of services ex-post. According to this view, the SSN is plagued by an efficiency problem, which is related to the issue of soft budget constraints, originating from the misalignment in responsibilities of spending and funding. We have evidence that the expectations of future bailouts negatively influenced expenditure, and propelled inefficiencies (Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Piacenza and Turati, 2010) . On the contrary, Southern Regions focus on the large differences in terms of availability and quality of services, which is a problem of equity in the access to health care (that can also generate a problem of equity in health). The difficulties in implementing some form of fiscal federalism clearly originate from this clash between efficiency and equity. The agreement on Regional federalism shows that the apportionment formula can be probably improved, but the structural problem of equalising resources in order to guarantee mandatory levels of care across the whole country cannot find an easy solution. Southern Regions will need also in the future to receive funds from other Regions; and this will continue to reduce their accountability from the financial side. 5 What can we do then?
The policy discussion in the country focuses on two main interrelated types of mechanisms: on the one hand, the improvement of the "identification strategies" of inefficiencies and corruption; on the other hand, the improvement in the accountability of local politicians to be obtained by developing new and alternative political institutions (given that fiscal federalism cannot work for Southern regions).
As for the first mechanism, one needs to recognise that the 1992-1993 reform A second institution that characterises the recent policy discussion is the so-called 'political failure', that is a system of disincentives for local politicians. At present, only citizens of indebted Regions (and, more generally, all Italian citizens) pay more local taxes as a 'punishment' for having elected inept representatives. However, to better control moral hazard by politicians, one should create a system of disincentives also for them. This should include the ban for local administrators who created a deficit to be commissioner of their own. At present, though incredible, the practice for Regional governments in financial difficulties is to assign additional powers to governors in office, i.e. Governors that presumably contributed to create the problem: that is, to use a 'carrot' in place of a 'stick'. A second provision should be an economic 'punishment' for local politicians, for instance by stopping remunerating the governor and all the member of the Regional Council, but also public funding for political parties sustaining the Regional government (Bordignon and Brusco, 2010) . A third provision is the 'end-of-mandate certificate' envisaged in the recent report by the ministerial Commission for the implementation of fiscal federalism (see Relazione sul Federalismo Fiscale, June 30 th , 2010, Rome) . At the end of each mandate, six months before new elections will take place, the Governors should basically provide a certificate (for which they are made accountable) that the budgets they signed are representing the true and fair view of the state of affairs in their Region, so to avoid undisclosed debts.
Despite the charm of these new ideas, I find they suffer of the same problem Besides this "short run" standpoint, one last word on a long run perspective for the Italian SSN. In terms of spending, since expenditure is clearly age-related, rapid population ageing is potentially a problem for expected spending growth. A large share of inpatients and of pharmaceutical expenditure are due to people over 65 years of age, which now accounts for 20% of the total population, but are projected to grow swiftly in the next decades, more than in other countries. The picture is even worse if we consider that -for a given individual -a large bunch of the life-time health spending is concentrated in the year immediately before death. Given life expectancy at birth is now few years above 80, one can consider the share of people over 80 years out of the total population as a more precise indicator of expected growth in spending. This share, which is now about 6% for Italy, is expected to more than double by 2050 (Eurostat). Over the same period, the EU 27 average will rise from 4.6 to 11%. Notice that the problem population ageing poses is not only in terms of rising expenditure, but also in terms of GDP growth: an older country will grow less, further reinforcing worries on how to finance expected increase in spending. The easy solution will be to recur to private insurance markets; and some hints in this direction have been already advanced in the policy discussion. But recurring to a 'second pillar' also for health care can be troublesome. The pensions reform implemented in 1995 will cut drastically public rents for the future pensioners, and reducing also health care services will impose a double-burden on these generations. On the one hand, they are now contributing heavily to sustain a generous welfare system for their parents, without receiving much in exchange, for instance in terms of schooling for their children. On the other hand, they will receive less in the future, because current constraints on public finances impose to restructure public welfare system to make these financially sustainable. How all this will impact on the Italian society is difficult to forecast. But, apparently, there are not good news.
